Abstract: Only a few studies, mostly in the case of school districts, have empirically examined the factors affecting municipal consolidations. This study contributes to the literature by empirically examining the decision of Connecticut communities to consolidate the delivery of public health services. As theory suggests, the prospect of scale economies is found empirically to increase the likelihood that a community consolidates public health services. In addition, differences across communities are found to inhibit the consolidation of public health services. Overall, the results imply that financial incentives may be necessary to encourage more regional districts because localities may underestimate the true minimum efficient scale for public health services and because heterogeneity among jurisdictions impedes regional cooperation.
INTRODUCTION
Special districts in the United States have increased nearly three-fold over the last 50 years or so.
1 Special districts provide water, fire protection, sanitation, and public health, among other important collective services. Economic theory suggests the number of special districts may have grown over time as individual local governments consolidated specific municipal functions to benefit from scale economies. Economic theory also
suggests that some local governments may not have merged similar municipal functions because of the real or perceived political externality costs, transaction costs, and principal agent problems associated with the consolidation of larger and more heterogeneous jurisdictions.
While theory seems to offer a good explanation as to why local governments may or may not consolidate municipal functions, few studies have directly subjected the theory to empirical testing (Bates and Santerre, 2008; Brasington, 1999 and 2003; and Gordon and Knight, 2006) . Moreover, these empirical studies are mostly limited to the consolidation of school districts. Yet, it would be beneficial to know the specific factors driving the creation of other types of special districts, especially if the consolidation of specific municipal functions is viewed favorably by higher levels of government.
Given the paucity of empirical studies devoted to the consolidation issue, this paper examines the decision of Connecticut communities to enter into a public health district relationship. More specifically, this study empirically investigates whether scale economies and community differences influence the regional consolidation of local public health services. The results may be important because many experts believe that public health will take on an increasing role in the future given the threat of bioterrorism attacks, concerns over emerging diseases such as avian flu and SARS, and the seemingly growing burden from natural disasters such as Katrina (Tilson and Berkowitz, 2006 ). Yet, concern has been expressed in Connecticut, the focus of the forthcoming empirical investigation, and elsewhere, that small, independent departments may lack the necessary resources to produce public health services cost-effectively (e.g., Hicks, 2004; Hartford Courant, 2009; and Penny, 2009 ). Sixty-two percent of all local health departments in the U.S. fall into the small category (NAACHO, 2006) . Many public health policy-makers argue that regional consolidation offers a solution to this problem. In particular, policymakers point out that regional public health departments provide more efficient administration, broader financial resources, improved personnel management, less duplication of resources, and improved reporting (Turnock, 2004) . If so, from a public policy perspective it may be important to know why some localities choose to offer public health services on an independent rather than a consolidated basis.
The next section of this paper develops the conceptual framework behind the empirical model of regional consolidation. Section III describes the sample and data used in the empirical test and section IV reports on the findings. A summary and some policy implications are offered in the final section.
PREVIOUS STUDIES, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, AND EMPIRICAL MODEL
Numerous studies, such as Adelaja and Racevskis (2005) Alesina and Spolaore (1997) , Alesina, Baqir, and Hoxby (2004) , Borck (1998) , Brasington (1999 Brasington ( , 2003 Brasington ( , and 2004 , Ellingsen (1998 ), Feiock (2007 , Gerber and Gibson (2005) , Krueger and McGuire (2005) , and Sorensen (2006) , have investigated the political economics of regional cooperation and consolidation. While these studies take different approaches and/or address slightly different issues, they all share two things in common. First, they agree that trade-offs are involved when local governments consider cooperating or consolidating municipal functions with other local governments in the region. 2 Second, all of these studies agree that this trade-off can be couched in terms of costs and benefits.
The benefits of cooperating or consolidating include any cost-savings from scale economies in production and the internalization of any externality problems in the region.
In this regard, smaller-sized communities have more to gain from cooperating or consolidating than larger jurisdictions do. Santerre (2009) finds that local public health costs per capita continue to fall with population until a minimum efficient scale (MES) of 100,000 people is served by a local public health department. However, Martin and McKenzie (1975) argue that consolidation may not offer tax savings for consumer-voters because bureaucrats siphon them off in the form of nonmonetary gains. It should be pointed out that Martin and McKenzie are referring to the consolidation of general 2 Local governments may also turn to contracting-out as an alternative method of delivering services. For relatively recent studies on the contracting-out decision see Boyne (1998) , Brown and Potoski (2003) , Ferris and Grady (1994) , Joassart-Marcelli and Musso (2005) and Nelson (1997) .
purpose governments such as cities or counties and not to the consolidation of a specific municipal function such as the delivery of public health services which is studied below.
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Principal/agent problems stemming from greater centralization, transaction costs relating to inter-local negotiations and agreement, and the costs associated with losing control over decision-making make up the cost side of the cooperating and consolidating calculus. The degree of heterogeneity among communities weighs importantly in determining the size of these costs. Greater heterogeneity among communities potentially raises both transaction and decision making costs. In fact, Brasington (2004) finds empirically that the loss of control over local public school services, because of consolidation, reduces house values by slightly over $2,900 or 3.5 percent assuming all other factors remain constant.
The few existing empirical studies model the decision to consolidate municipal responsibilities as a function of a community's economic and demographic factors as well as the difference between the community's and potential merger partner's characteristics (Bates and Santerre, 2008; Brasington, 1999 and 2003; and Gordon and Knight, 2006) . In addition, Brasington (1999 and 2003) , Ferris and Graddy (1988) , and Bates and Santerre (2008) allow for the possibility that an inverted-U relationship may hold between the population in a community and the internal production of municipal services. Ferris and Grady find that medium-sized communities are more likely to retain internal control for the provision of public health services, whereas both small and large local governments contract out to a greater degree. Brasington, (1999 Brasington, ( , 2003 determines empirically that medium-sized schools are less likely than small or large schools to form a regional school district with surrounding communities. In contrast, Bates and Santerre find that medium-sized communities are more likely to consolidate public health activities. Brasington (1999 and 2003) and Gordon and Knight (2006) find evidence that consolidation of local public education services involves a trade-off between scale economies and loss of decision-making. Bates and Santerre (2008) show empirically that differences among communities inhibit the regional consolidation of public health services but do not study the effect of scale economies.
To model the decision to consolidate public health activities, we employ the median-voter framework adopted by Bates and Santerre (2008) . A large number of studies have found the median-voter model represents a useful conceptual device when examining collective decision-making, particularly at the local level of government (e.g., Borcherding and Deacon, 1972; Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973; and Santerre, 1985) . In Based on fairly normal assumptions, public choice theory predicts that the median demand dominates over all other demands when collective political outcomes are decided by a simple majority voting rule in a direct democratic setting (Downs, 1957) .
Interestingly, many communities in Connecticut, the observations used in the forthcoming empirical analysis, have retained the open-town meeting which is a direct democratic form of local government. But even in a mayor-council or council-manager form of government the median-voter model may hold because politicians in a representative democracy gravitate towards the middle of the preference distribution to maximize their number of votes (Downs 1957) . It follows under these two conditions that the median-voter, as the swing-voter in each community, decides either directly or indirectly if that particular community should enter into a district relationship with another community or other communities for the provision of a specific public service.
The median-voter in a particular jurisdiction decides in favor of consolidation if she expects her utility to increase upon joining a district. Utility increases if the expected benefits from any economies of scale and internalization of spillovers, , conditioned upon her current tax-share or price, P i , income, I i , and tastes and preferences for a particular public service, T i , exceed the expected cost, , associated with consolidation.
As discussed above, expected costs consider the loss of political control, any transaction costs associated with negotiating with partners, and the potential principal/agent problems that may arise in larger organizations. She realizes that these "political externality costs" are likely to be higher when the characteristics or attributes of the community in which she resides differ significantly from those of potential district partners, . Political externality costs are higher because heterogeneity may result in the consolidated entity not providing the collective good at a level demanded by that particular median-voter. Consequently, she votes in favor of consolidation or merging 
From th s expression, a re uced-f
i d orm version can be written as:
The relationship between each of the independent variables in equation 2 and net benefits is fairly straightforward. A direct relationship can be expected between the median-voter's tax-share, P, and her propensity towards consolidation. Assuming all other factors remain constant, it stands to reason that the median-voter has less to gain from consolidation when her tax-share for public health services is relatively low.
Oppositely, when the tax-share for public health services is relatively high, consolidation offers a greater chance of reducing her overall tax burden.
As far as income is concerned, Bates and Santerre (2008) find that public health services represent a normal good which means the demand for public health services rises with income. If that finding can be generalized, then the influence of income, I, on the decision to consolidate depends on whether the median-voter perceives the output of public health services will rise or fall upon consolidating services. If she believes public health services will rise, then wealthier individuals will be more likely to vote in favor of regional consolidation. With respect to tastes, the median-voter favors consolidation when she has a strong preference for public health services and consolidation improves its delivery when c pared to independent production. om
Of course, , the median-voter's net benefit from consolidation is not directly observable. However, we do observe some information about that will allow us to determine how P, I, T, or individually influences the median-voter's choice behavior because we know or how that median-voter actually voted. Thus while we cannot distinguish between a strong and weak yes, we do observe if = 1 or = 0. If we let represent the vector of independent variables in equation (2), our regression e ten as: mod l can be writ
with reflecting the vector of parameters to be estimated and μ capturing the random error term. The related observable variables are 1 if 0 and 0 if 0.
OBSERVATIONS, VARIABLES, AND DATA
With observations for a variety of communities and relevant data, probit analysis can be used to estimate equation 3 Connecticut municipalities voluntarily participated in 18 unified health departments. The number of communities in a district health department ranges from 2 to 19. While this decentralized structure makes Connecticut relatively unique (NAACHO, 2006) and therefore the findings may be non-generalizable, the more centralized public health infrastructures in other states do not allow one to observe the decision to voluntarily join a local public health district. Hence, the underlying demand for consolidation cannot be estimated in those other areas. 4 We also experimented with a bivariate probit model because consolidation involves both political entities jointly voting in favor of it and not just one. However, the bivariate probit model would not converge using either the LIMDEP or STATA statistical packages. In any case, we are not totally convinced that a bivariate probit model is necessary in this case given that both equations specify the same right-hand side variables. For example, suppose 2 communities, i and k are deciding to combine into a district. The probability of community i voting to join a district can be written as . Similarly, the probability of community k voting to join a district equals . The probability of each community deciding to join a distinct is a function of its own characteristics, or , the difference between the two sets of characteristics, D, and the potential for scale economies among the two, S. Therefore , , and , , . Of course, we never observe the individual probabilities; we only observe the joint probability or or , , , . Assuming the partial effects of and on are equal (and why not) then , , where X = either or . Thus, the estimation of a bivariate probit equation is unnecessary in this case much like it is unnecessary to use seemingly unrelated regression for a system of equations with the same right hand side variables.
In the towns and cities of Connecticut, the authorized legislative body (open-town meeting or town-council) must vote to form or join a district with neighboring communities. A community can also decide legislatively prior to the beginning of any year to withdraw from a district if that community has been a member for at least two years. While an existing district must approve membership, it receives $2.43 per capita from the state for any town with population under 5,000 and $2.08 per capita for any town with 5,000 or more people. The district board also levies a head tax on all of the participating communities. The amount of the head tax varies widely across the public health districts in Connecticut. We should also note that the Connecticut State Department of Public health mandates several services, such as restaurant and septic system inspections, which are mainly funded by fees. Districts also apply for grants from the state and federal governments and other private sources to cover the costs of providing additional public health services.
To implement the test, we need some method of matching up communities for consolidation purposes. Thus, it is assumed that each community views its potential merging partner or partners in one of two ways. First, our "single-model" supposes the median-voter in each community considers the consolidation of public health services individually with each of its adjacent communities. For this matching model, the characteristics are simply those of the adjacent community. This matching assumption results in 878 matches because the typical community faces 5 to 6 adjacent communities on average. If two adjacent communities were in the same public health district in 2004, the dependent variable in equation 3 takes on the value of one. Otherwise, the dependent variable takes on the value of zero. About 25 percent of the 878 matches reflect two communities in the same public health district.
One advantage of this single-model is that all Connecticut communities can be used as observations in the empirical test. Another advantage of this approach is that a community may actually consider just the characteristics of a nearby community, and not the characteristics of all of its potential partners, when deciding to consolidate public health services. This method of deciding might economize on decision-making costs. For example, median-voter i may think joining a district would be beneficial because community j, which shares many similar traits, already belongs to it. The last advantage of this approach is that a community can choose to form a district with any one community or all of its neighboring communities.
The alternative "group-model" uses only those communities who currently belong to a public health district or are located adjacent to an existing public health district.
Thus, each community is matched up with a nearby district or the district to which it currently belongs. In this case, characteristics are determined by calculating the weighted averages of all of the characteristics of the communities belonging to a particular public health district exclusive of the selecting community if it also belongs to that district. This group model results in 268 observations with roughly 34 percent of the matches involving a district relationship. Notice that, in effect, the group-model questions if a particular town will join an existing district whereas the single-model examines if a community will form a district with a neighboring community.
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The equalized or effective mill rate in each community serves as the tax-price of the median voter. Total property values represents the relevant tax base because property taxes provide the main source of funding in Connecticut communities and tax rates are constant across different types of property (e.g., residential, commercial, and industrial).
Following studies on the demands for local public goods such as Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) , the median-voter is assumed to possess the median level of income in each community. The tastes and preferences of the median-voter regarding public health services are assumed to be shaped by the demographic and physical composition of the community in which she resides.
Therefore, the proportion of the population that is elderly (65 years of age and older), the percentage of the population that is white, population size and land area of the community are specified as taste variables in the estimation equation. While the rest of the taste variables are specified in linear form, community population enters the probit equation in quadratic form because the net benefits from consolidation may be nonlinear with respect to community size as discussed previously.
According to the conceptual model, differences between communities may impose political externality costs and thereby impede consolidation. In the empirical analysis, the absolute differences of several characteristics are specified: tax-price, median income, population, percentage of the population that is white, and land area. A negative coefficient estimate is expected on each of these absolute difference variables.
Given that some public health services are devoted to environmental issues such as water quality and sanitation, the difference in land area is included because a geographically small community may believe that a geographically larger community will draw more attention and resources from the district public health department. 6 To capture the potential for scale economies, the population of each community is added to the population of each of its adjacent communities or the district and the resulting combined population is specified in the estimation equation in quadratic form. An inverted-U relationship seems appropriate between the likelihood of consolidation and combined population because economies of scale may at first encourage consolidation but diseconomies may set in after some level, at least in a perceived sense.
Finally, the residual term in equation (3) 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
The results for the probit analysis are reported in Table 2 The estimated negative coefficient on income implies that higher income communities are less likely to form a district with a neighboring community, ceteris paribus. That inverse relationship may hold for a number of reasons. 7 First, the medianvoter in a wealthy community may be concerned that forming a district with a lowerincome community may result in a lower level of public health services supplied than she desires. This is particularly true if public health services represent a normal good as shown empirically by Bates and Santerre (2008) . Second, higher-income communities may be better able to afford the provision of local public health services on an 7 We thank the anonymous referees of this journal for pointing out two of the reasons.
independent basis than poorer communities. Third, assuming some substitutability between private medical care and public health services in the production of health, wealthier individuals may choose the more expensive option of purchasing their health services in the private marketplace. Finally, higher-income communities may face a more difficult time finding a potential merger partner with similarly high income.
Four of the five estimated coefficients on the absolute difference variables possess negative signs, as expected. A Wald test indicates that the estimated coefficients on the absolute difference variables are collectively significant at the 0.0054 level with an Fstatistic of 3.34. Moreover, on an individual basis, the findings suggest that differences in median income and land area matter more at influencing the decision to consolidate on a statistical basis. Thus, the empirical results support the hypothesis that differences across communities inhibit consolidation.
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The results for the single-model also show that community population does not influence the decision to form a public health district. In contrast, the combined population of the community and partner town does affect consolidation in an inverted-U fashion. Its inverted U-shape reflects that perceived economies and diseconomies hold with respect to forming larger public health districts. By taking the first derivative of the single-model specification with respect to combined population and setting the resulting expression equal to zero, we can solve for the population at which diseconomies set in with respect to producing public health services. The calculation indicates that perceived diseconomies set in at a combined population of roughly 47,000 people, which is slightly 8 Note that both the percentage of the population that is white and absolute difference of the percent white have no statistical impact on the decision to form a district. That result may hold because the percentage of nonwhite population is relatively small at about 9 to 10 percent on average in Connecticut, particularly after controlling for population and population differences because nonwhites live disproportionately in the larger cities.
more than twice the size of the typical Connecticut community. As mentioned previously, Santerre (2009) finds empirically that the MES of a public health department occurs at roughly 100,000 people. Interestingly, Gordon and Knight (2006) report a relatively low perceived MES for local public education services in Iowa.
Estimating the marginal effects of the various independent variables may help determine if differences across municipalities or scale economies matter more at the margin in terms of influencing the decision to remain independent. Point estimates drawn from a probit function are highly sensitive to specification so Studenmund (2006) recommends a rough approximation by multiplying each estimated probit coefficient by 0.4. Following through with his recommendation indicates the marginal effects are economically tiny. This may mean that any single factor does not, in isolation, significantly influence the decision to consolidate. Moreover, while collectively the various factors matter, the relative inertia to a single factor may explain why so many municipalities continue to operate independent public health departments.
Turning to the results for the group-model matching scheme in Table 2 , a different story is portrayed. Similar to the single-model matching scheme, joining a public health district is more likely when the tax share is higher, median income is lower, and more elderly people reside in the community. However, in the case of joining a district, community population does affect the decision to consolidate. In particular, compared to an otherwise similar small or large community, the results imply that a medium-sized community is more likely to join an existing health district. Indeed, according to the estimated equation, a community with 34,000 people is the most likely to join a health district, ceteris paribus.
Four of the five difference variables possess negative coefficient estimates but only land area possesses an estimated coefficient that is different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. Thus, community differences do not seem to matter as much when joining an existing health district as compared to forming one with a neighboring community.
A noticeable difference between these and the single-model results is the estimated U-shaped relationship between combined population and the probability of joining a health district. One possibility is that the U-shaped relationship reflects that relatively small and large public health districts are more successful at attracting new member towns than medium-sized districts. Small health districts may mean less losing out on political decisions whereas large districts may offer huge scale economies. Solving for the district size at which the probability of joining a health district is minimized results in a population of 203,000. With only 6 of the 268 matches resulting in combined populations greater than 203,000, a more prudent interpretation is that an independent community is less likely to join larger districts, ceteris paribus. Recall that the singlemodel estimates the perceived MES occurs at roughly 47,000 people. Combined population lies below 47,000 for only 33 of the 269 group-model observations and the average level is nearly 94,000 people (see Table 1 ). Consequently, this observed inverse relationship between combined population and the probability of joining a public health district may simply reflect that independent communities are less likely to join larger districts because most consolidations result in combined populations beyond the MES.
While a few communities belonged to public health districts as far back as the late 1960s, any community can choose to withdraw from a district in Connecticut after a two year membership period. In fact, three communities withdrew from existing health districts over the last 12 years. Another district dissolved itself two year prior to the year under observation (2004) with one of the two formerly participating communities joining another district and the other remaining independent. Yet, since 2004, another district has been formed and eleven communities have joined existing districts. The implication is that the net benefit calculus of belonging to a district, as summarized in equation 1, is continuously made by each and every community and current rather than past values of the independent variables are relevant.
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Nevertheless, we also test if "path dependent choices" influence the results by restricting the sample to communities that consolidated after 1995. A cut-off period after 1995 results in too few observations for pairs of communities belonging to a public health district. The probit regression results are shown in Table 3 for the two different matching methods. Notice that the multiple regression results are very similar to those in Table 2 and suggest that the regression results are not greatly affected because the decision to join or form a health district had been made many years earlier.
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9 One of the authors of this paper served on the board of finance of a town participating in a public health district. It was not unusual for discussion to take place about withdrawing from the district during annual budget deliberations. Discussion involved the current costs and benefits of remaining in the district.
10 Both of the estimated coefficients on the location variables are consistently positive and statistically significant for three out of four specifications. These results suggest that towns and cities located at a greater distance from both Hartford and the coast are more likely to consolidate their public health services, ceteris paribus. A glance at a Connecticut map of independent and consolidated districts shows that is definitely the case with few exceptions. For reasons, other than those already captured in the regression equations, towns and cities in the northeast and northwest corners of the state are more likely to cooperate or coordinate decisions regarding public health services.
SUMMARY
This paper offers some information regarding the factors influencing the regional consolidation of public health services. Only Bates and Santerre (2008) empirically examine the consolidation decision regarding public health services but they did not consider if communities merge public health activities because of scale economies. This study finds that a community considers both the potential for scale economies and political externality costs when forming a public health district with a neighboring community. In fact, the empirical results suggest that perceived diseconomies set in at relatively low range of population. This may mean that consumer-voters underestimate the true scale economies associated with the consolidation of public health services. Also similar to Bates and Santerre, this study finds, not surprisingly, that towns lean more towards the regional consolidation of public health services when their tax rates are relatively high and the people in the town are relatively poor.
This paper also analyzes the decision of a community to join an existing public health district. The empirical results indicate that the decision to join an existing district is also directly related to tax share and inversely related to income. Moreover, the findings indicate that medium-sized communities are more likely than small or large communities to join an existing health district. Finally, empirical results for both the single-and group-models, taken together, imply that jurisdictional heterogeneity matters more for the decision to form a health district with an adjacent community than the decision to join an existing health district. It may be that the averaging or smoothing of characteristics across the towns and cities in a district makes a district more appealing than any one individual town.
One interesting aspect of the results is the general similarity of the empirical findings for both the local public school and public health department consolidation decision. Both sets of research find that potential scale economies motivate and heterogeneity hinders consolidation. The decision to consolidate public schools is politically a much hotter issue than the consolidation of local health departments. More people expect to benefit from their children being educated in the local school than they expect to benefit from a local public health initiative such as a bioterrorism threat or communicable disease outbreak. In addition, a much greater amount of money is spent on local schools than local public health. Recall the small head tax for public health services in Connecticut. In addition, Santerre (2009) In the case of local public health departments, which are studied here, the conventional wisdom is: "If you've seen one local health department, you've seen one local health department" That is, local governments, lacking a national template regarding an effective structure, organize their local public health departments in countless ways (Tilson and Berkowitz, 2006) . The myriad of organizational forms may create challenges for the coordination of the entire national system particularly in a time period facing bioterrorist threats and natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. If so, and if national uniformity is valued by society, regional consolidation may provide one way of moving towards that goal. However, the results from this paper suggest voluntary movement may be limited because of differences across communities and a relatively low perceived minimum efficient scale for public health services. The implication is that higher levels of government might want to use financial incentives to induce more local governments to form regional public health districts. 
